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What role has poststructuralist literary, critical, and cultural theory played in the making of the humanities, particularly in the period between 1968 and the p resent, and what role should theory have going forward as we come to terms with the corporatization of higher education, with its stress on practical skills, vocation al training, and on measuring concrete learning outcomes? Exploring these questions requires confronting -and linking -two key issues currently at the core of sometimes-fierce debates about the humanities in the West, and particularly in t he US.
T he first issue has to do with whether or not theory since 1968 has served to undermine the traditional coherence of a humanities education, and the second has to d o with how humanists and their supporters respond rn assertions the humanities have little value because they do not teach students practical skills. In the US in particular these two issues have gotten intertwined.
I will be arguing that since theory has always been central to the humanities it is a mistake to argue it has somehow undermined and marginalized them. This is especially the case at a t ime when questions are being raised about the practical skills humanities students acquire, for the skill of critical thinking is at the very heart of an education in theory. C laims that a humanities education has no practical utility are surprisingly common. Indeed, such a claim is often worn as a badge of prestige by humanists themselves. For example, the well-known literary critic and New York Times columnist Stanley Fish has insisted that the humanities don't do anything, if by' do' is meant bring about effects in the world. And if they don't bring about effects in the world they cannot be justified except in relation to the pleasure they give to those who enjoy them. To the question 'of what use are the humanities~', the only honest answer is none whatsoever.' And Funk Donoghue, writing about the marginalization of the humanities in an increasingly vocation-centered university, sur renders to a dangerous fatalism. 'Curricula change overtime: he notes, 'and the humanities simply don't have a place in the emergent curriculum of the twenty-first century'.' With friends like this the humanities do not need any enemies.
T he failure to rise to the challenge of defending the humanities in terms of t he p ractical skills they teach is all too often a retreat into idealism. Worse still, it usually comes off as defeatist. It avoids the necessity of developing a pragmatic position in t h e face of realities that are not going to go away. Arguing that the humanities have gotten sidetracked by abstract, esoteric theories fails to recognize t h at theory is intimately related to critique, that critique has been at the center of debates about humanism since its inception, and that critique is demonstrably connected to the practical skill we sometimes too loosely call 'critical th inking'. For t his reason, highlighting the role of theory as critique in the humanities is one of t he best ways to highlight the practical utility of a humanities education.
Critical Theory and the end/ ends of the humanities Observers who complain theory has ruined the humanities argue that from 1850 to about 1968 the humanities developed a curr.icular and intellectual coherence that was successively undermined by structuralist, deconstructive, psychoanalytic, queer and Marxist theory, and later by multiculturalism, feminism, and the rise of postcolonial and cultural studies. 3 This old coherence was based largely on an attitude of deference to canonical texts and traditional humanist ideals. It was connected to what the American critic Andrew Delbanco has called a curatorial model of scholarship and teaching.• According co this narrative, the primary role of the humanities was to preserve and explore a great tradition of humanist work in literature, p hilosophy, the fine arts, history, and religion, encouraging students, following Matthew Arnold's ideal, to study with d isinterest the best that has been though t and written.
The problem with theory, from Delbanco's perspective, is that it abandoned deference and disinterest in favor of criticism, fracturing a coherence organized around great books and the ostensible pursuit of'universal truths' at t he core of Western humanism. The complaint about theory from this perspective is that its focus on difference and diversity turned our attention away from what unites us to what divides us. According to this narrative, difference replaced universality as the key principle directing the pursuit of knowledge in the humanities. Following this new model, the humanities turned its attention to analyzing the exclusion of differences as a constitutive move in the construction of the very notion of a 'common humanity: and this attention led to an explosion of work across the d isciplines of the humanities on the importance of particular d ifferences related to things like culture, gender, race, and sexual orientation. It also red to what traditional humanists came co feel was a counterproductive critique of humanism itself, one that undermin ed the very notion of a humanities education.
Of course traditional humanists were hardly wrong in seeing theory as a threat to humanism, for theorists as varied as Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, and Louis Althusser (along with French feminists such as Monique Wittig, Luce Irigaray, and Helene Cixou:s) often presented their work as announcing the end of humanist man. While humanism tended to see the human subject as a sovereign agent, language as a transparent medium for that agency, and truth as the product of a reason that transcended history, these theorists and their followers quest ioned the autonomy and agency of the subject, the transparency of language, t he foundations of reason, and the whole idea that truth could stand outside history and culture as universal and foundational. The most oft-cited version of this idea is Foucault's declaration near the end of The Order of Things that 'man is neither che oldest nor che most constant problem chat has been posed for h uman knowledge; chat 'one can be certain that man is a recent invention ( ... ] and one perhaps nearing its end'.~ Derrida's critique of metaphysics, the questions he raises about the idea of presence, and his criticism of the equation between voice, reason, and the subject, was also framed as a frankly anti-or posthumanist app roach to subjectivity. And the work of both Derrida and Foucault is consistent with that of Althusser, who insisted on the fundamentally anti-humanist orientation of Marxism and argued that the putatively autonomous humanist subject was a product of ideology and language, a being not sovereign bm interpellated. From this point of view, theory's critique of humanism seemed to betray the very ideals upon which t he humanities were built. 6 Why? Because theory substituted ideological critique for disinterest, made it more d ifficult to explor e our common humanity, and seemed to fracture the curricular coherence of a h umanities educat ion by marginalizing t he great works of the Western tradit ion in favo r of inferior texts by formerly marginalized writers.
While there is no denying how dramatically poststructuralist theory has transformed the humanities, it is by no means necessary to see theory as anti-humanist. Indeed, as Martin Halliwell and Andrew Mously have shown,7 h umanist t hought is too diverse a tradition to be reduced to a single line of thinking about human subjectivity. They question the standard narrative that contemporary critical theory constituted a 'complete rupture' with h u manism. Instead, they argue chat the work of thinkers like Baudrillard, Derrida, Foucault, Kristeva, Lacan, and Lyotard, ought co be seen as developing a more nuanced, self-reflexive, and 'rigorous theory' of rhe human. From this point of view, contemporary critical theory 'takes the human to be an open-ended and mu cable process: bur chis does not have co be seen as an anti-h umanism. A 'poscfoundacionalist view of the h uman: suspicious of essentialist categories, is in their view an 'ethically and politically grounded humanism'. 8 I think they are right, and that it is important to recognize not simply how contemporary critical t heory can be u nderstood as an attempt to productively modify the substance of h umanist thinking, but how the kind of critical thinking theory performs is itself central to the tradition of humanism. The danger in d ismissing t heory as anti-humanist is that it runs the risk of elevating subjects of knowledge (call it cultu ral literacy) over learning how to think critica!!y about systems of though t, ideologies, and authority (what I would ca!! critical literacy). One of the most significant drawbacks of this position is that it sees objects of knowledge and the practice of critique in e ither/ o r terms. This p roblem is exemplified by Delban co's distinction between curation and criticism. According to Delbanco, the humanities went astray when criticism overwhelmed curation, when theory and the critique of humanism took the place of the humanities' responsibility to p reserve and venerate a traditional body of knowledge (and the seemin gly timeless author ity it had) . What this point of view misses, of course, is the reciprocal relationsh ip between curation and criticism, for to a significant degree the act of curation requires criticism, and criticism is itself a form of curation.
A curator does not j ust make decisions based on quality and d istinction. He or she is also critically and imaginatively involved in putting together objects in ways that produce new relations between things and new forms of knowledge.
Humanities scholars and educators curate by bei ng critical in this more capacious sense of the term. Contemporary work in the h umanities is therefore curatorial in the best sense of the word. It both reorganizes old materials and gathers them together with new materials to create new perspectives on both the past and the present. This means theory is not a threat to the curatorial enterprise, but rather, is central to its inte1lectual and pedagogical vital ity.
Because theoretical thinking has always been central in mainstream humanism, the distinction between preservation and critique simply does not hold up. Delbanco wants the great texts or art works in literature, philosophy, art history, or religious studies to be the primary focus of attention, but in a way that runs the risk of separating them off -even protecting them -from criticism. In h is view the act of curation must always take precedlence over what he takes to be the counterproductive practices of criticism. My point, of course, is not to argue that Delbanco gets it backwards -chat the humanities ought to be all about criticism and t hat they ought to put curation on the back burner. My point is that the two activities are interdependent. When we articulate the value of the humanities we need to emphasize not only the body of knowledge they preserve bur also the value of the forms of critique they teach, and co underscore chat critique is a pract ical skill integral to both scholarly work and critical citizenship.
Theory, critique, and the tradition of humanism Now, what do I mean when I invoke the word critique, and how has critique been central to the making o f the humanities~ Let me be clear: by critique I do not simply mean critical th inking. The phrase 'crit ical thinking' has become a terribly overused catch phrase in discussions of higher education, and it is often very loosely defined -if it is defined at all. By critique I mean the practice of systematically analyzing and interrogating the constitution of conceptual categories and the sources of t heir authority. Critique explores h istorically and conceptually the development of norms t h at regulate our personal, social, and political lives together (for that matter, it explores the historical constitution of the very'we' these norms are supposed to protect).
It is important to stress here that there is such a thing as critique itself-separable from particular critiques of particular discourses. And critique can be taught, not just particular critiques, but the activity of critique per se. Indeed, this is what we teach when we teach critical theory. Judith Butler, writing about Foucault's conception of critique, h as observed that critique will be dependent on its objects, but its objects will in turn define the very meaning of critique. Further, the primary task of critique is not to evaluate whether its objects -social conditions, practices, forms of knowledge, power, and discourse -are good or bad, valued highly or demeaned, but to bring into relief the very framework of evaluation itself. 9 This meta-level in critique, this bringing'into relnef the very framework of evaluation itself' is at the heart of the activity we call critique.
Critique is, in this sense, at the very heart of the humanist enterprise. It involves the kind of abstract, systematic thinking we associate with Kant's theory of the aesthetic, Hegel's dialectic, Marx's analys is of the class st ructure or the operations of ideology, Nietzsche's idea of the death of god, or Freud's work on the unconscious, or his great work, Civilization and Its Discontents. But it also involves our evaluating the very frameworks of evaluation that have been employed to think about those critiques, including our own evaluation of those evaluations. Indeed, it is quite impossible to think about humanism, and thus the humani-ties, without thinking of rhe primary role char dissent and critique played in the development of Enlightenment thought, especially in terms of its radical proposals about human liberty and agency, about the primacy and autonomy of the individual, and about th e natural or human rights everyone is ent itled to. All of these ideas involved a theoretical critique of the status quo. It was what h umanism, at its very foundations, was all about. From this point of view, the criticism of t heory's place in the humanities makes no sense. Worse still, it seems to strike at the very heart of the humanist enterprise, relegating its critical vitality to the past. Seen this way, humanism is over, fixed, curated, and sanitized. It is worth y of historical study, bur not someth ing that still lives.
One thing that is particularly interesting about Butler's d iscussion of Foucault's approach co critique is her focus on how he associates critique with virtue, the cultivation of which -along with an ethical sensibility -we like to associate with a humanities education. About h is idea that 'chere is something in critique chat is akin to virtue' Foucault observes,' 0 virtue is most often understood either as an attribute or a practice of a subject, or indeed a quality that conditions and characterizes a certain kind of action or practice. It belongs to an ethics which is not fulfilled merely by following objectively formulated rules or laws. And virtue is not only a way of complying with or conforming with pre-established norms. It is, more radically, a critical relation to chose norms."
This critical relation to norms, Buder emphasizes, involves 'a resistance to authority', something Butler points out Foucault saw as absolutely central to Enlightenment critiques of the status quo.
Although Butler is quick to point out that most Enlightenment thinkers would not understand the link between critique and virtue in this k ind of way, she insists that 'chis resistance would not invalidate' th e link Foucault makes, for what he 'seeks in the characterization of the Enlightenment is precisely what remains "unthought" with in its own terms: hence, his is a critical history' of critique." 'In h is view', she concludes, 'critique begins with questioning the demand for absolute obedience and subjecting every governmental obligation imposed on subjects co a rational and reflective evaluacion'.' 3 Foucault's connection between virtue and critique, of course, is aimed precisely at exposin g these operations and therefore has the potential to be liberatory.
Linking theory to critique, and considering its liberatory potential in the way I have been sketching out, underscores a key problem with conservative criticisms of theory. On t he one hand, the popular idea that theory has ruined t he humanit ies is often based on the quite accurate idea chat theory has had a lot of critical 66r things to say about humanism. Bur on the other ihand, that argument misses the fact that theory's critique of humanism is thoroughly consistent with the centrality and purpose of critique in humanism itself, and that its purpose, by and large, has been to ensure the ideals of liberty and agency at the heart of humanism are extended to everyone. For chis reason, contemporary theory -contemporary critique -ought not to be thought of as anti-or posthumanist, :although as we have seen above, some theorists like to style it that way. In my view, such terms are quite counterproductive. In an age when the humanities are imperiled, it makes little sense to use the rhetoric of anti-or posthumanism in articulating its value. There is no reason why theory and its critique of humanism cannot be folded into a positive articulation of a twenty-first-century humanism.
Instead of seeing theory as a threat to humanism, new ways of chinking about the human subject, the role chat language plays in constructing reality and shaping meaning and value, and how gender, sexual orientation, race, ethnicity, and class both shape identity and enable or circumscribe agency, ought to be seen as constructively rethink ing and expanding traditional humanist claims about individuality, autonomy, liberty, and rights. In my view, contemporary forms of humanistic critique are, by and large, interested in helping co broaden, and diversify these claims, co make che discourse of humanism more, not less legitimate.
Although in its most radical moments, theory seemed to be announcing the end of man or the beginning of a poschumanisc age, it has actually represented constructive, forward-looking dissent from the historical limits of humanism, dissent chat sought to expand, correct, and broaden humanist ideals.
Examples abound. Although, as we have seen, Foucault's remarks about the 'end of man' have often been cited as an example of the anti-humanist orientation of contemporary theory, it makes more sense to see his work on the relationship between subjectivity, discourse, ideology, and power -along with theory's general critique of the idealist human subject of eighteenth-and nineteenth-century philosophy -as a contribution to refining and clarifying our humanist understanding of subjectivity and agency. From this point of view, contemporary theory is all about insuring that the !humanist guarantee of agency and rights is extended to everyone, not just the traditional human subject of universal man'.
Here, of course, feminist theory becomes another, crucial example of a critical theory chat, while it might be presented as anti-humanist, is anything but. On t he one hand, feminism dissents from humanism's notion of'man', based as it is on the universaliz ing of a version of human nature derived by, and largely based on, male experience, but on the other hand feminism is linked to humanism in its insistence that women be accorded the same set of rights and the same kind of autonomy and agency associated with traditional humanism. On the critical side, of course, feminist theory and history help foreground the patriarchal orientation of humanism. Not simply in the trivial and quite obvious sense that virtually all of the early thinkers and writers associated with humanism were males whose status as scholars and educators was predicated on all of the privileges chat came with being male in a patriarchal system, privileges that were unavailable to women (who, more often than not, were treated as the property of men). The less obvious but perhaps even more important point is that the identity category of gender is altogether absent inside humanist thinking about the human. We should not see this simply as linguistic hair splitting, believing that the great writers of Renaissance, Enlightenment, or modern humanism meant to include women when they wrote 'man'. Too often t hey did not. Humanist 'man' was conceptualized from the experience of male human beings; it is about forms of power, thought, agency and autonomy (not to mention access to education and therefore to the very activity of scholarship upon which humanism is founded) historically only accessible to men.
However, as critical as feminism is of how humanism's philosophy of man kept women disenfranchized, it is important to see contemporary feminist theory as part of a struggle to expand humanism's ideals with regard to individual autonomy and liberty rather than as an attempt do away with humanist ideals altogether. Like Marxism, feminism has had a double relationship to humanism, simultaneously launching a critical dissent from, and insisting on the broad legitimating and application of, its central ideals about human individuality, autonomy, and agency. This kind of work, while often cast as post-or anti-humanist, ought to be understood as part of an evolving discourse within humanism about what it means to be human, and about what ought to be included in a humanities education. Ir constitutes both a dissent from humanism, and an extension of its logic. Theory, critique, and critical thinking Linking theory to critique, and critique to critical thinking, not only makes intellectual and historical sense. It makes strategic sense as well. Critical thinking is routinely cited as the single most important practical skill the humanit ies teach, yet, as I indicated earlier, it is often invoked with little attempt to define it. Many of the same people who are critical of the role of theory in the humanities are the same people who emph asize the importance of critical thinking, which means they ar e missing the fact that critical theory courses are some of the best courses in critical thinking we have in higher education. Seeing critical theory as training in critical thinking emphasizes the general utility of such courses, but it also helps add substance to a concept that is often invoked but rarely defined in discussions about higher education . For example, The Foundation for Crit ical Thinking outlines an approach to critical thinking that links it to the kind of theoretical think-ing associared with srrucruralism, deconstruction, and ocher social, cultural, and polirical rheories that challenge received dogmas and entrenched assumptions.•• For example, rhe foundation's mission statement declares that critical thinking cultivates 'intellectual discipline( ... ) self-reflection and open-mindedness; insisting that it requires a break with 'automation and! fixed procedure' and embraces 'radically different' forms of'thinking ( ... ] adaptable, more sensitive to divergent points of view'. And critical thinking is also tied explicitly to sociar changes under globalization.
The world in which we now live requires ·that we continually relearn, that we routinely rethink our decisions, that we regularly reevaluate the way we work and live. In short, there is a new world facing us, one in which rhe power ( ... ] to regularly engage in self-analysis, will increasingly determine t he quality of our work, the quality of our lives, and perhaps even our very survival.
This approach to critical thinking underscores its foundations in theoretical thinking and critique in disciplines across the humanities, but also to challenging, resisting, and rethinking those forms in the very act of using them. From this point of view you cannot have critical thinking without theory, for what's being subjected to critical thinking here are entrenched, naturalized professionalized assumptions and protocols. Critical thinking involves asking challenging quest ions about ways of t h inking and conceptualizing problems that have become automatic and fixed. T h is approach to critical thinking, which deal s with received concepts 'openmindedly within alternative systems of thought, recognizing and assessing, as need be, their assumptions, implications, and practical consequences; is strikingly in sync with the sh orthand definition of theory Jonathan Culler provides. 'The main effect of theory: he points out, 'is the disputing of'common sense': common-sense views about meaning, writing, literature, experience'.'' Theory, from th is perspective, is a form of critical thinking that in challenging old, naturalized orthodoxies gets us to see that what we take to be 'common sense' explanations and assumptions are in fact theories. For 'theory; Culler explains, is an 'attempt to show that what we take for granted as "common sense" is in fact a historical construction, reflecting a particular theory that has come to seem so natural to us that we don't even see it as a theory'. 16 T in the context of divergent points of view about their core beliefs, to rethink and reevaluate rheir positions, and to entertain radically different forms of rhinking about !how meaning is produced, about the relationship between arr, philosoph y and power, and about the relationship between class, gender, race, sexual orientation, and social justice. From this point of view theory, as it challenges traditionally entrenched ways of doing intellectual and historical business, is an important vehicle for critical think ing and is thus central to the core m ission of the humanit ies. Indeed, it is one of the most concrete examples we have of teaching critical thinking.
Conclusion
To come back to the double argument I have been making, all of this means not only that theory ough t not to be seen as a disnaction from what the humanit ies should be doing, but even more importanttly, that theory ought to be seen as central to both the history of humanism and the range of practical skills we teach in the humanities. We should not allow theory to become the scapegoat for what crit ics believe is w rong with the humanities. Indeed, we need to go beyond defending theory and actively argue for its centrality in the tradiitions of humanism we teach, and the contemporary humanities we increasingly have to defend. 
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